GOP chastises Malloy for 'non-essential' projects

Of course Moody's downgraded New Jersey's debt three months ago:

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NEW YORK | Wed Apr 27, 2011 4:40pm EDT

(Reuters) - Moody's Investors Service on Wednesday cut New Jersey's credit rating a notch, citing the state's weakening financial position.

Moody's said the state's economy is unlikely to recover any time soon and is threatened by rapidly rising fixed expenses, a slow economic recovery and a lack of specific plans to rebuild its depleted reserves.

The rating agency, which cut New Jersey by one notch to Aa3 from Aa2, also cited the Garden State's $31 billion public pension shortfall -- an issue that forced downgrades across the country in recent months...

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Meanwhile, Standard & Poor's and Fitch continue to give CT "stable" outlooks and maintain our very high bond rating.

And, by the way, who gives a s__t what Moody's has to say anyway?, other than they are a top 3 player in the bond rating world. Moody's proved its utter worthlessness in helping cause the international financial meltdown which hurt CT in the first place.

From Business Insider:

Former Moody's President Explains The Ratings Agencies' Role In The Crisis In 3 Words

Katya Wachtel|Feb. 24, 2011, 3:24 PM

It's almost scary how blasé Brian Clarkson, the former president of Moody's, is on the part that ratings agencies played in the market crash of 2008.

Thanks to Ben Protess at Dealbook for audio-mining the FCIC testimony of Clarkson, which, even from the small sampling of the information, is enough to paint a picture of, at the very least, Clarkson's attitude to Moody's role in the crisis.

Clarkson is "hazy" on pretty much everything, and his answer to every question appear to have fallen into two categories: "No"; and "I don't recall."

Clarkson spent 17 years at the ratings agency -- he headed up its structured-finance unit during the mortgage boom -- and was annointed President in 2007, before retiring in 2008. He obviously has a deeply institutional knowledge of the firm, yet, his testimony gives the impression of a man who was completely disconnected from the company over which he was supposed to reign.

In sum, his explanation for how ratings agencies is three words: "I don't know."

We can't tell if that's saying nothing, or everything.

According to Dealbook,

In private testimony... Mr. Clarkson didn’t remember crucial details about his tenure, including staffing decisions and overall strategy. Mr. Clarkson’s vague responses are sprinkled throughout his six-hour-long interview...

Clarkson’s written testimony for the hearing — which he never delivered — was largely unapologetic. He said the risk posed by subprime securities “was well understood by Moody’s,” which had a “culture of candor, transparency and responsiveness to market dynamics.”

When Clarkson was asked what his plans had been for Moody's after he was elevated to president in 2007, he said: "No, I don’t remember any goals.”

When Clarkson was asked whether Moody’s gave discounts to certain banks that sought out ratings, he said: “I don’t know.”

When Clarkson was asked personnel changes that took place as the firm courted Wall Street, he said: “I don’t recall specific analysts.”

When Clarkson was asked whether he had any discussions about firing employees who voiced fears about the dangerous nature of the Wall Street-Moody's relationship, he said: “I don’t recall.”

Another highlight, in fact, was the discussion of the incestuous relationship between Moody's and the bank's who it was supposed to be objectively grading. Clarkson testified that Wall Street outreach and cultivation was central to his job:

From the day that I started at Moody’s, Moody’s was deeply concerned about the relevance they had in the marketplace. A rating agency may have a methodology that is superior. But if they’re not assigning any ratings, they don’t have any relevance in the marketplace.”

But perhaps most disturbing off all, was when Clarkson was asked about his biggest regret as a Moody’s employee. And his answer had nothing to do with bank failure, or the millions of American's that lost millions of dollars because they invested in shoddy products pedalled by banks that Moody's gave a AAA rating. It was about the damage to the Moody's name:

Regret is a tough word. I regret that the assumptions we made along the way in certain areas were not predictive. I think that, externally, they hurt Moody’s reputation

Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/fcic-testimony-of-former-moodys-president...

This is insane. NONE of these projects should've been funded with State bonding, with the one possible exception being the beach sand and erosion-mitigation project in Milford (assuming it's a public beach) - and no, I do not live in Milford.

And that New Britain-to-Hartford busway project will ONLY make sense if the "feeder" routes actually become operational and IF people who'd use the system will have some way of getting to their destinations to and from the bus pickup/drop-off points. I don't see how it can succeed because of these issues, but if it doesn't I suppose at least the highway could be used as an alternate route by automobiles if the bus system fails... and at least the feds are or will be kicking in a substantial amount of funding for it.

@meridenite - Your comments show that you have no clue. Expanding a health center, moderate housing redevelopment, Old State House renovation and harbor dredging should be paid out of operating budget funds? Let me explain to you. Projects that benefit taxpayers over a long period of time are financed by bonds so that people who benefit from them in the future will bear a portion of the cost. In addition, if anyone was foolish enough to do it your way, they would all be paid for by property taxes, which are among the most regressive, and have the biggest impact on the elderly, living on a fixed income. But, since it takes a while to explain the actual financial details, it does make for good politics to attempt to equate the bnd funds with layoffs. Good politics, but bad policy.

Let a private history group have and maintain the Old State House. It's an heirloom which the State can no longer afford, whose budget is not remotely justified by it's utilization by the public, and whose maintainance has skyrocketed even though it was completely renovated 8 years ago. Time to say goodbye and give it to the DAR or some such group.